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The ending of Japan`s ODA loan programme to China – All`s well that ends 
well?` 
 
Professor Reinhard Drifte          
 
Introduction 
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the most important instrument of 
Japan’s postwar diplomacy, and nowhere has this been more the case than in 
Japan’s China policy after the start of Beijing’s economic reform programme in 
1978. The amount of Japan`s ODA to its neighbour is truly impressive: Between 
1979 and 2005, Japan transferred ¥3.13 trillion to China in loan aid (yen loans), 
145.7 billion yen in grant aid, and 144.6 billion yen in technical cooperation and 
became thus China’s greatest bilateral ODA donor for many years.(1) Loan aid is 
not only by far the largest aid segment in the transfers to China, but reflects a 
general feature of Japan’s ODA. Together with Japan’s multilateral aid to China, 
one can certainly state that Japan has to be credited with one of the most important 
external contributions which made China’s economic development so fast and 
impressive. 
 
The ODA programme has given Japan in the past considerable political leverage 
over China, helped to keep disputes at a more manageable level (e.g. the territorial 
dispute over the Senkaku/Daiyutai Islands in 1996) and to exert pressure on China 
against its military policies.(2) Japan sent a negative signal to China in the wake of 
the Tiananmen repression in 1989 when it joined Western sanctions by suspending 
its ODA although its resumption before that of most other Western donors also 
constituted a powerful positive signal.  
 
It is in the very nature of a successful ODA programme that it has to end one day, 
and governments and international aid institutions have criteria linked to 
developmental levels of recipient countries for the phasing out of aid. However, in 
2005 the Japanese government decided to end its loan aid to China by 2008, the 
year China will stage the Olympic Games, without applying the usual guidelines. 
In view of the importance of the yen loan programme for Japanese-Chinese 
relations and the acrimonic exchanges which accompanied the decision this article 
proposes to investigate the reasons and background to it. 
  
To understand the process leading to this decision and its wider implications I will 
look at the rise of Japanese criticism of the ODA programme to China against the 
background of a general deterioration of bilateral relations as well as a revision of 
Japan’s overall ODA policy (quantitatively as well as qualitatively) and ODA 
administration. With the gradual power shift from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) as the main decision maker to the LDP, leading politicians critical of 
China (and supported by a broad anti China mood swing of the general public) 
were thus able to push a reluctant MOFA in 2004 to a fundamental ODA change, 
i.e. the ending of ODA loan to China by 2008. 
 
Economic asssistance or reparations?     
 
Japan`s ODA programme to China started when Tokyo granted Beijing in 
December 1979 $200 million for six construction projects as well as a grant of $61 
million to assist in the building of the China-Japan Friendship Hospital. The doors 
to receiving foreign aid were opened by the Chinese government`s reorientation of 
its foreign economic policy in 1978.(3) Like in the case of most policies, the 
Japanese decision to give ODA to China was the outcome of the workings of 
overlapping policy constituencies and political orientations.  
 
The Japanese government under Prime Minister Ohira conceptualized economic 
assistance as part of its policy to assist China with its modernization, expecting that 
this approach would make China a peaceful player and make China follow a 
moderate policy consistent with Japanese interests.(4) This policy is part of Japan`s 
engagement policy (kanyo seisaku) which consists of providing political and 
economic incentives to China (e.g. ODA) while at the same time hedging with 
political and military power balancing (e.g. the Self Defence Forces and the 
Japanese-American security alliance.(5) As such, providing ODA to China was a 
highly political decision, carried by politicians whose prewar biography was 
closely linked to China (`Koain Group`, or `Asian Development Agency Group`). 
Moreover, it was the biggest ODA programme which Japan had ever for a 
Communist country and was initated at a time of considerable economic troubles 
for Japan.(6)  
 
Providing ODA was facilitated by Japan`s high foreign currency reserves and trade 
surpluses. This approach also corresponds with Japan’s political inclination to use 
economic power to create a peaceful international environment, while playing 
down the Realist aspects of its policy as embodied in its political and military 
alignment with the US. This economic approach is based on the premise that 
support of China’s economic reform programme will create a peaceful and 
Western-oriented China. It plays down the risk of freeing Chinese government 
funding for military purposes and the possibility of China (later) hijacking its 
economic strength for non-peaceful purposes.(7) In terms of Japan’s domestic 
mood, there was full support for economic aid to China since public opinion was 
very favourably disposed towards China and willing to accept the political and 
economic rationales although by 1979 the `Panda euphoria` of 1972 had already 
waned somewhat. 
 
Japanese business interests were keen on government loans to China in order to 
secure major orders from China and in particular to salvage as much as possible of 
China’s huge plant contracts which had been severely reduced in spring 1979 by 
the Chinese government when it realised that it had overreached itself. Perhaps not 
surprisingly this loan programme gave rise to American concerns that Japan was 
acquiring an unfair trade advantage in China.(8) 
 
Internationally, conditions for ODA to China were facilitated when the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD classified China as a 
Less Developed Country which enabled Japan to provide loans to China as ODA 
and thus quiet concerns in developed as well as developing countries about 
Japanese gaining an unfair advantage in economic dealings with China and 
favouritism for that country, respectively. 
 
Other factors of a moral and normative kind had also an important bearing on 
public Japanese support for the ODA programme. One was Japanese gratitude for 
the Chinese renunciation of reparations in 1972 which had been motivated by the 
desire to win over the Japanese public, to avoid antagonizing the still very strong 
pro Taiwan forces in the Japanese ruling party, to strengthen its strategic position 
against the Soviet Union by establishing diplomatic relations with Japan and to 
avoid appearing less generous than the Taiwan government which had earlier done 
the same. However, this renunciation was also made against the mutual implicit 
understanding that good relations between China and Japan would be good for 
China`s economic development in the future. This unspoken understanding 
translated into Chinese expectations for economic assistance from Japan after 
China`s economic opening in 1978 and a certain Chinese disillusionment with the 
Chinese-Japanese economic relationship .  
 
In fact some reparations had been paid to then Republic of China under the 
Guomindang between 1948 and 1949, but soon the Allied occupation authorities 
under American leadership changed their mind in view of the onset of the Cold 
War. In June 1947 24 Japanese military and civilian ships had been sent as 
reparations to Shanghai, Qingdao and Taiwan. Some Japanese production facilities 
in China were given to the Chinese government as Japanese reparations.(9) In 1952 
Taiwan renounced in its Peace Treaty with Japan any reparations, ‘consistently 
pushed by Japan’.(10) The leadership of the People Republic of China had also by 
1964 concluded to waive compensation claims when it would come to the 
normalization of relations. At the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
in 1972, there was, however, no explicit link between this Chinese waiver of 
reparations and ODA because China was not yet even contemplating allowing 
foreign direct investment, let alone aid into the country.  
 
A link between the renunciation of reparations and ODA was established only at 
the end of the 1970s as can be observed in numerous statements and writings in 
both countries. There are references to Japan’s obligation to reflect on its past by 
giving China ODA, apart from other more self interested considerations by Japan 
(e.g. geostrategic considerations; direct economic interests of Japan’s plant 
exporters, ODA as an important part of Japan’s engagement policy). Kokubun 
Ryosei argues that neither side said at the time formally mentioned or established 
in documentary form such a link and it could therefore only be surmised that the 
link was made psychologically by the generation that had experience of the 
war.(11) Iokibe Makoto refers to ODA as ‘quasi reparations’ (jun baisho).(12) The 
link was also used as an argument to convince the opponents of economic aid to 
China.(13) Japan’s business representatives were actively using China’s reparation 
waiver to press the government for special loan treatment of China. In April 1978, 
just when Japan was hit by China canceling many plant orders, the chairman of 
Nippon Steel as well as of the Association of Japan-China Economic Cooperation, 
Inayama Yoshihiro, was quoted as saying that ‘Since China did not take 
reparations from Japan, the Japanese government should make special exceptions 
to such things as loan interests’.(14) 
 
The Japanese government itself used the link between reparations and ODA when 
it tried to win support for the programme. In 1983, when Japan’s second Yen loan 
programme was being debated, Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro reminded the 
members of the Diet’s Budgetary Committee that China’s renunciation of 
reparations had made the normalisation of bilateral relations possible, and that 
Japan upon reflection of the past wanted actively to cooperation with China’s 
construction work.(15) 
 
One can therefore conclude that by the end of the 1970s the Japanese side had 
established a link between China`s renunciation of reparations and ODA for moral 
as well as practical reasons, and the Chinese side expected after the 1978 economic 
opening that Japan would show itself grateful and generous. At this time China had 
also become somewhat disillusioned with the economic relationship and some 
Chinese blamed Japan for the need to cancel many plant orders. This morphing of 
reparations into ODA was, however, to have political costs for the Japanese as well 
as Chinese side. It considerably diminished China`s gratitude for Tokyo`s largesse 
in the following years because the aid was seen as something China was `owed` for 
its generosity after having suffered so much from Japan`s encroachment before 
1945. On the Japanese side the opportunity to undo the harm of the past by 
providing ODA which Japan gives to many other countries as well may not have 
helped many Japanese to come to terms with its past, or at least not to a degree 
which would satisfy the Chinese side. ODA has not the same emotional impact as 
reparations. Fujiwara Kiichi argues that, in comparison with Southeast Asian 
countries to which Japan gave reparations, the war responsibility of Japan is now 
considered a matter of the past, whereas in the case of China, although the Chinese 
understand Japan’s ODA as reparations, it is officially not called reparations. He 
concludes therefore that Japan paid a high price for the Chinese waver.(16) Finally, 
and this would play an important role in the Chinese rhetoric when faced by 
Japan`s decision in 2005 to end the ODA loan programme, if the Chinese had now 
begun to consider ODA as a Japanese obligation as a result of their past sufferings 
and their waver of reparations, how can one come to an agreement of ending such 
an obligation? Even before the issue of ending loans came onto the agenda, the 
Japanese felt often annoyed or embarrassed when the Chinese side reminded them 
about this link in order to extract more assistance and/or better conditions. For 
example, in 1987, at a moment of Chinese dissatisfaction with Japan’s export 
surplus and other economic grievances, Deng Xiaoping reminded Komeito 
Secretary General Yano Junya that China had renounced reparations and that in the 
Eastern order (toyou jori) this meant that Japan should make more contributions to 
China’s development. This was rebutted by a Gaimusho statement which aroused 
great emotions in China, and in which it is said that Deng Xiaoping was seemingly 
already sitting on a cloud.(17) When Japan suspended the major part of its grant 
aid in 1995 in protest against China`s resumption of nuclear tests, the People`s 
Daily wrote that Japan`s grant aid had a special historical background.(18) It was 
therefore not surprising when in 2005 the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman 
criticized the Japanese intention of ending the yen loans by saying: ''Yen loans are 
a mutually beneficial arrangement that came into being under special policies and 
against a historical backdrop''.(19) 
 
“For Japan’s benefit”                   
 
This latter quote contains also a further point which affects negatively Chinese 
recognition and gratitude for Japan`s ODA programme, i.e. the Chinese perception 
of Japan benefiting economically itself from the programme. However, ODA is 
never pure charity, and we have seen above the business interests (as well as 
political interests) involved in starting and sustaining the programme. Based on a 
Realist perspective of international relations there is the general conviction that 
ODA is beneficial two both donor and recipient and is not a favour given by the 
former to the latter. This is clearly understood by Chinese scholars who have 
written on Japan`s ODA.(20) Still, the Chinese attitude of over-emphasizing 
Japan`s economic benefit, reinforced by the implicit linkage to the reparation 
waiver, reduces the weight of other Japanese motives for ODA and thus the 
Chinese need for gratitude and recognition. 
  
Some of this criticism of `Japan benefiting itself` derives from the tying of ODA to 
business interests in the donor country. Japan particulary has often been criticized 
for this link, but nowadays most of the ODA loans are untied and the share of 
resulting orders for Japanese companies has gone down from around 50 % in the 
latter half of the 1980s to 15 % in 1998.(21) However, grant aid is tied to 
procurement from Japanese companies. But most of the criticism is due to the fact 
that ODA loans have to be repaid with (albeit very low) interest, and there is the 
general impression that they are therefore a kind of business and for the benefit of 
Japan.(22) This is true to a certain extent but the interest and repayment conditions 
are much more generous than for commercial and international financial 
institutions` loans, otherwise these loans would not qualify as ODA according to 
the guidelines of the OECD to which Japan adheres. In the 1990s the repayment of 
these yen loans temporarily put considerable strain on China because of the rise of 
the Yen and China complained about it. However, China has always repaid the 
loans in time. Finally the overwhelming part of Japan`s ODA has been loans which 
are invested in China’s economic infrastructure which often is linked to Japanese 
trade interests (e.g. ports and roads).(23) 
 
Japanese grievances 
 1. China`s economic success and its impact on Japan    
 
The most obvious circumstance to consider about ending of aid is the recipient`s 
economic success. Since the middle of the 1990s public opinion, the media and the 
political-economic leadership in Japan became increasingly aware of China’s fast 
economic progress and its various direct and indirect implications for Japan itself 
and for the region. Particular lighting rods have been China`s own aid programme 
and iconic achievements like the begin of manned space craft launches. The 
Chinese space flights in October 2003 and 2005 exerted a particularly negative 
influence on Japanese public opinion because of the budgetary extravagancy for a 
country beset with so many developmental problems like China and the lack of 
anything comparable in Japan to the Chinese space programme. 
 
Some of the implications of China`s economic achievement have been perceived as 
negative for Japan and have therefore become arguments to support an end to the 
loan programme: China’s economic development carries the seeds of 
self-destruction in terms of ecological unsustainability, political unsustainability 
(the creation of social imbalances and dislocations), and even economic 
unsustainability (for example the possibility of a collapse of the underlying 
economic model of export-led and FDI-driven development due to an international 
recession). These negative developments have started to affect Japan by way of 
transboundary pollution, illegal immigration, transboundary crime and the loss of 
competitivity in many manufacturing sectors. The success of China’s economic 
development generates also increased international competition for scarce raw 
materials, food and energy resources on the international market. Finally, China’s 
economic success with its demographic and geographic dimensions will not fail to 
affect Japan’s relative economic position and identity as the world’s second largest 
economic power.(24)  
 
However, it is also recognized in Japan that China`s economic success has become 
a prerequisite for Japan`s economic recovery and in 2004 China overtook the US 
as Japan`s biggest trading partner. Prime Minister Koizumi declared already in 
April 2002 at the Boao Forum on Hainan island that China`s economy was not a 
threat but an opportunity and this has been consistently Koizumi`s official line. On 
the other hand, all this raises the question in Japan why the country should any 
further provide China with ODA. 
 
The Japanese government normally applies a variable scale of economic 
achievement indicators which have been developed by the World Bank to 
determine when to finally end various categories of aid programmes. In the case of 
ODA yen loans, the executing Japan Bank of International Cooperation JBIC, 
formerly the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund) works with five categories 
(GNI based on 2003 figures) : 
 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
Poor countries (under $765 per capital GNI 
Low income countries (between $766 and $1,465) 
Middle Income countries (between $1,466 and $3,035) 
Medium developed countries (between $3,036 and $5,295) 
 
(25) 
    
The fact that based on such indicators China has to be graded as a Low Income 
country indicates that spectacular economic growth and phenomenal exports do not 
directly translate into a high category which would graduate a country from all 
loan programmes. The reason for this circumstance is, of course, China`s huge 
population and widening income differentials. Even according to official Chinese 
statistics, already in 1999 the per capita GDP was Yuan30,000 in Shanghai, 10,000 
Yuan in the coastal areas from Beijing down to Guangdong, but under 5,000 Yuan 
in middle and western inland regions.(26) If an assessment of China`s loan 
eligibility would be based on the above scale, China would simply lose some 
particularly concessionary loan programmes, such as happened with the special 
super-low interest rate long-term financing programmes of the International 
Development Association and that of the ADB.(27) In 1999 China lost its 
eligibility for concessionary IDA lending under the lending guidelines of the 
World Bank. The latter is mentioned in the Foreign Ministry`s Economic 
Cooperation Programme for China of October 2001, but with no hint to Japan 
ending any kind of loan programme. Britain stopped since 1997 to extend ODA 
loans to China and has since then only provided grants and technical aid.(28) 
China will probably reach by 2008 the level of $1,600 per capita if current growth 
rates of 9 % can be sustained, but still not rank among the middle income countries. 
However, China`s favourable economic situation raises at least questions about the 
government`s choice of budgetary allocations as well as about the availability of 
loans at commercial conditions. Since China has developed so well and has an 
economy which is relatively open it has become much easier for it to find as well 
as to afford loans at normal commercial rates. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji is even 
quoted having said in October 2001 to a group of overseas Chinese technologists 
that what China was not having sufficiently was high technology and modern 
management know how, not capital.(29) 
 Still, applying or not applying the above scale is in the end a political decision. 
Japan committed to South Korea from 1983 to 1990 ODA loans amounting to $1.8 
billion which were disbursed until the end of the 1990s.(30) Japan stopped offering 
grant aid to Thailand in fiscal 1994, while continuing to offer yen loans and 
technical cooperation. It stopped offering grant aid to Singapore in Fiscal 
Year1988, and ended all forms of ODA to the country in fiscal 1999.  
 
2. Japan`s loss of leverage    
 
One of the major objectives of Japan`s ODA programme towards China has been 
to gain some leverage over the direction of China`s economic and political 
development. Economically, these objectives have been achieved to a considerable 
extent, and, together with the competition of ODA from other countries (notably 
some sectors like the environment where thanks to international ODA competition 
the government can actually chose the donor) and the increasing availability of 
loans at commercial rates, Japan`s leverage is naturally declining. With China`s 
economic strengthening, any political leverage is also rapidly declining. In 2001 
Jin Xide, a researcher at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, still argued that 
the Japanese ODA programme had also been a success in so far as it has 
suppressed to some extent trouble originating from issues related to Japan’s past 
and the Japanese-US security treaty.(31) In 2000 the temporary withholding of a 
decision on ODA in relation to Japan`s demands for `prior notification` for 
Chinese research vessels wanting to operate in Japan`s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) in the East China Sea had helped to find a compromise. But while in 
1995-97 Japan could still send an important political message to China with the 
suspension of its grant programme in response to China’s resumption of nuclear 
testing (even if it had only a very limited impact on China), such influence has 
become now even more doubtful in view of China’s economic success and the 
resulting growing assertiveness and self-confidence.(32) In addition, 
political-economic conflict and rivalry have increased since the second half of the 
1990s while Japan`s dependence on the China trade has become crucial for Japan`s 
economic revival. Against this changing background, any political 
operationalization of Japan`s ODA would only inflame Chinese political opinion.  
 
Closely linked to Japan`s loss of leverage is the lack of Chinese recognition for 
Tokyo`s economic assistance. The relative ignorance of the Chinese people about 
Japanese aid or at least their incomplete understanding of the character of ODA as 
explained above has naturally also limited its political fungibility. Moreover, this 
lack of gratitude and recognition has become a major argument in the public 
discussion about the ending of ODA to China. In their report on ODA in 
November 2004, the Upper House representatives e.g. complained that the 
memorial plate informing about Japan’s contribution to the building of the Beijing 
airport was hardly visible.(33) The Chinese government has lately recognized that 
this Japanese perception is reducing the political sustainability of ODA among the 
public in Japan. In October 2000, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji admitted he had not 
sufficiently conveyed to his compatriots the extent of Japan’s ODA.(34) 
 
The Chinese recognition of the aid programme has also been handicapped by the 
language used to describe the programme. Both sides refer to what is translated in 
English as ‘economic cooperation’ and is called in Japanese keizai kyoryoku 
whereas the Chinese use jingji hezuo which gives particularly in Chinese the 
impression of economic cooperation of equals for mutual benefit. However, ODA 
by definition is not cooperation between equals, otherwise it would not be 
necessary. This problem is even more acute in the case of ODA loans as is e.g. 
illustrated by Jin Xide of the Japan Research Institute of CASS who said in an 
interview that the yen loans which are the major part of Japan`s ODA are seen in 
China as part of the introduction of foreign capital and not as aid.(35) 
 
3. China`s own aid programme    
 
Since around 2000 China`s own aid programme has also become an important 
argument for ending Japanese ODA. According to the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs China transferred in 2000 $450 million (54 billion yen) in 
assistance to 58 countries. (36) In October 2005 China announced as its 
contribution to the UN Millenium Programme $10 billion over the next three years 
in terms of loans and export credits. It is not only the fact that China is seen as 
having enough budgetary means to extend economic assistance itself, but the 
government is also concerned about the non transparency of this development aid 
(e.g. conditions, recipient countries). Moreover, some of this aid are exports credits 
which under the DAC rules are not ODA but referred to as Other Official Flows 
(OOF). Since its economic conditions are not made public, the Japanese 
government officially refrains from referring to this Chinese assistance as ODA. 
The Economic Cooperation Programme for China of October 2001 expresses this 
Japanese concern by saying that `in the future, Japan will urge China to improve 
transparency in its third country assistance by encouraging China to make public 
the results`. However, at least what concerns the principle of an ODA-recipient 
providing itself already ODA, Japan has to remember that it was still itself a 
recipient of economic assistance when it started to give ODA from 1954 onwards 
when joining the Colombo Plan. It received World Bank loans for infrastructure 
projects (including the first Shinkansen line) until 1964. This was also admitted by 
Iimura Yutaka, then Director-General of the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs when confronted with this criticism in 2000.(37) 
Finally, India, which is now among Japan`s top three loan recipients, has itself a 
considerable ODA programme. 
 
4. China`s military buildup    
 
It has been particularly China`s military rise and its military policies which not 
only fed the argument that China was now rich enough and no longer in need of 
ODA but also that Japan was ill advised to nurture a growing military threat 
through its aid programme. Security concerns had already surfaced when Japan 
debated the start of its ODA programme to China in 1979 because of Beijing`s 
nuclear power status and Japan`s ban on arms exports. Naturally any economic 
assistance can at least indirectly contribute to the recipient’s military efforts since 
it frees the recipient`s scarce resources for them. In order to exclude at least the 
transfer of military hardware, Prime Minister Ohira promulgated in 1979 what 
became known as the three principles of economic cooperation with China and 
which explicitly excluded military aid. 
 
With the Chinese military`s two-digit annual increases starting in 1989 the 
Japanese government had since at least March 1991 on several occasions linked 
the continuation of ODA with the expansion of China’s military budget and greater 
transparency.(38) In April 1991 the Kaifu government established its four ODA 
Guidelines which became in June 1992 part of the Official Development 
Assistance Charter of Japan.(39) Among a series of principles, the following were 
related to security: 
 
- the avoidance of aid being used for military purposes or the aggravation of 
international disputes 
 
- consideration to be given to defence expenditures, development and production 
of weapons of mass destruction and missiles; attitudes towards export and imports 
of weapons 
 
The first principle can certainly be applied to China as long as Beijing does not 
rule out the use of force in the resolution of the Taiwan issue which can be classed 
as an ‘international dispute’ (which is not the case in China’s eyes!). However, the 
ODA principles (including the fourth one on the promotion of democracy and a 
market-oriented economy, fundamental human rights, protection of freedom) were 
promulgated with many different objectives in mind, and the Japanese government 
always responded when asked about inconsistencies in the principles’ application 
that it would consider each country on its own merits. However, since their 
promulgation government representatives have tried in their meetings with Chinese 
officials to link China’s security policies with the terms and conditions of Japan’s 
ODA although this did not have any practical consequences. The influential 
conservative Japan Forum on International Relations demanded in a policy 
recommendation paper on China in January 1995 that the four ODA principles 
should be strictly applied to take a clear position on China’s military buildup.(40)  
 
In the end, the only application of the military-related principles of the ODA 
Charter to China occurred when China resumed nuclear testing in 1995 to which 
Japan reacted with the suspension of grant aid for the fiscal year 1995 to March 
1997.(41) Takamine Tsukasa argues that a brief suspension of ODA loans in 1996 
– although not publicly announced – was a Japanese warning signal against 
China`s missile tests and manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait.(42) Also not explicitly 
related to the ODA principles was the brief postponement of a ¥17.2 bn special 
loan package to China by the LDP’s Foreign Affairs Committee in summer 2000 to 
protest against the increasing number of Chinese naval incursions into Japan`s 
territorial sea and EEZ as mentioned above.  
 
In the end, the territorial conflicts in the East China Sea around the ownership of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the fixation of the maritime border, the Chinese 
naval buildup as well as its military incursions into EEZs claimed by Japan became 
important arguments for demands to end the loan programme and to shift the 
emphasis of Japan`s ODA to the interior provinces, to poverty alleviation, to the 
protection of the environment and even to the improvement of the Chinese Japan 
perception (e.g. through youth exchanges). 
 
At the beginning of the new millenium a series of demands related to various 
Chinese military policies emerged from some of the media (43) and from within 
the ruling LDP. In May 2000 Foreign Minister Kono Yohei told his Chinese 
counterpart Tang Jiaxuan that the government would review its policy on official 
development assistance to China, citing Tokyo’s concern about a steep increase in 
China’s military spending to which Tang responded that ODA should not be 
discussed in a ‘political context’.(44) In November 2000 Kamei Shizuka, the 
Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, startled the public by demanding a 
30 % reduction of Japan’s ODA to China as a ‘shock treatment’ against China’s 
military buildup.(45) In July 2001 Finance Minister Shiokawa Masajuro called it 
“foolish” for Japan to give ODA to “a country that 
atomic bomb or missiles.” (46) Reference to the ODA Charter and in particular to 
China’s military expenditures were made in the Economic Cooperation Programme 
for China in October 2001 which became a turning point in the reorientation of 
Japan’s economic assistance. The Programme recommended that ‘Attention must 
be paid to ensure that Japanese ODA to China does not lead to a strengthening of 
Chinese military capacity or other developments inconsistent with the "Principles" 
of the "ODA Charter."’(47) 
 
General change of Japan’s ODA policy and their implications for China   
 
Before coming to the developments in 2004-05 leading to the decision to end the 
loan programme, it is also necessary to consider the general changes of Japan`s 
ODA policy since the second half of the 1990s and their implications for the 
economic assistance programme to China. 
  
In the 1990s, Japan’s ODA underwent changes at the level of involved decision 
makers, aided sectors, distribution, quantity and political conditionality. The latter, 
as we had seen above, became official policy in April 1991 when the Kaifu 
government established its four ODA Guidelines which became in June 1992 part 
of the Official Development Asisstance Charter of Japan. Japan`s budgetary 
constraints (by 2006, the state`s debt burden in relation to the country`s GDP 
amounted to 170 %) prompted the government to slash the ODA budget by over 
30 % since 1999. The ODA budget for FY 2006 was cut by 3.4 %, a decrease for 
the 7th straight year, i.e. down to 759.7 billion yen ($6.5 billion), from 786.2 billion 
yen in the previous year.(48) However, the true picture is rather more complicated 
because at the same time the FY2006 budget was approved by the cabinet, the 
latter also approved ODA spending in the supplementary budget for fiscal 2005, 
which rose to 32.3 billion yen, about twice the amount of last year's supplementary 
budget which was 15.5 billion yen.(49) Moreover, Japan is under pressure to 
reverse the decrease of ODA. The 2005 report by Jeffrey Sachs to U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan says wealthy nations must increase their ODA to 0.7 percent 
of their gross domestic product (GDP) by 2015 if the U.N.'s Millennium 
Development Project is to achieve its poverty-reduction target. The Japanese 
government declared in response that it wants to aim for such an increase without 
being specific.(50)  
 
As a result of several critical reports, ODA scandals and public criticism of 
traditional ODA policy, focus is now put on poverty alleviation, environmental 
sustainability, and human security. Increasingly, the government relies on the 
distribution of ODA by NGOs, whether Japanese or foreign. More attention is paid 
to the efficacy of ODA, accountability and maintaining public support. 
 
Finally, an important development has been the relative decrease of influence by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the benefit of a much stronger role by politicians 
of the ruling coalition and public opinion, both having become much more critical 
of China. Whereas the start of ODA to China in 1979 was also mainly driven by 
pro-China politicians (supported by a pro China public opinion), and then for over 
20 years carried out by bureaucrats under MOFA leadership, the situation had now 
changed back again to a politician-driven policymaking process, but no longer with 
a China-friendly approach. Moreover, ODA has generally become of greater 
interest to politicians because of the government`s budgetary constraints. The 
deterioration of Japanese-Chinese relations has politicized ODA as a foreign policy 
tool. The role of the bureaucracy in general has become a popular target of 
criticism, and the China School of the Foreign Ministry has been singled out for 
being too soft on China.(51) As a result, some diplomats of the China School 
became China policy hardliners themselves.(52) The future of ODA and the role of 
the Foreign Ministry in it has become a critical issue for the latter because most of 
its budget is ODA-related. Whereas the ODA share in its budget was less than 
20 % of the Ministry’s total budget at the beginning of the 1960s, this increased to 
over 70 % in the 1980s.(53) 
 
These developments affected directly policies towards the Chinese ODA 
programme. One of the earliest consequences was the shortening of the allocation 
period. China had been the only Japanese aid recipient which received ODA loans 
on a multi-year commitment basis instead of on a single-year basis in order to 
accommodate China`s five year planning system. But to regain more control and 
leverage over its loan programme, the Japanese government agreed in 1998 with its 
Chinese counterpart to end this system from Fiscal Year 2001. However, in reality 
MOFA is still trying to work within the Chinese long-term time framework which 
is also often more natural because of the duration of many projects.  
 
In 2000 a Foreign Ministry Advisory Panel under the chairmanship of Miyazaki 
Isamu suggested that the amount of official development aid (ODA) to the PRC 
could be reduced in light of Japan`s severe fiscal conditions and various public 
criticisms of China.(54) On the basis of it the Gaimusho planned to prepare the 
Country Assistance Programme to China, but at the request of the LDP the title 
was changed to Plan of Economic Cooperation to China in order to express the 
idea that the LDP no longer considered China a devleoping country.(55) It stated 
that from now on Japan’s as well as China’s national interest should be taken into 
account when selecting projects. This meant support for projects related to the 
environment, economic reform, policies to eliminate poverty in inland areas, and 
training of people to improve mutual understanding. Particularly relevant in our 
context is the proposal that infrastructure project should now be undertaken by 
China itself and loan commitments be put on a single-year basis. The Ministry`s 
White Paper on its ODA published at the end of March 2001 admitted that among 
the Japanese public there were ‘harsh views’ concerning ODA to China.(56) 
 
A report by the LDP published also in December 2000 was much harsher that that 
of MOFA, taking up more of the criticisms mentioned above. Particularly relevant 
in our context is the LDP`s proposal to enhance the political effect of Japan`s aid 
by including untied loans – non-ODA government loans- as a component of 
Japanese development funds to China.(57) 
 
A report in July 2002 by an advisory panel to Prime Minister Koizumi (headed by 
Okamoto Yukio) recommended in its general ODA recommendation to be careful 
with any ODA reduction (sakugen ni shincho ni), and on ODA to China it 
recommended that ODA should be redirected towards the interior of the country as 
well as environmental conservation, energy projects, a better understanding of 
Japan (e.g. youth exchanges) and the creation of a better legal system for 
intellectual property rights (`good governance`). (58) 
 
The loan package for FY2004 reflects the new direction of Japan’s loan policy. Of 
the seven projects, six are environmental conservation projects, accounting for 
94 % of the total amount. Although called ‘environmental conservation projects’, 
this includes loans for ensuring better water supply and water treatment systems or 
even installing a natural gas pipeline to convert energy sources from coal to gas, 
thus still having much the character of infrastructural projects. (59) 
 
Declining loans and rising repayment       
 
Against the above background, ODA loans to China have dropped significantly. 
Having achieved their highest level in 2000 with Y2,144 bn, they declined to Y889 
bn in 2004 (cir. $870 million) (see Table 1). This put China fourth after India, 
Indonesia and Turkey whereas for a long time China was either 1st or 2nd after 
Indonesia. 
 
Table 1  
 
Japanese Yen Loans to China on a Commitment basis (Unit:Yen100 million) 
 2000   2,144 
2001   1,614 
2002   1,212 
2003    967 
2004    859 
 
Source: JBIC Press Release 
 
At the same time as the cumulative total is still growing, so is the repayment total. 
This development is hardly mentioned in the public discussion in Japan, and the 
incomplete information provided by the Japanese government as well as the 
confusing terminology is not helping either. The Japanese government does not 
disclose the interest element of loan repayments for a specific year although it 
makes public the interest rate of a loan when the commitment is made. The 
terminology and the categories used by the Japanese side and the OECD are also 
diverging. The Japanese statistics are based on commitment, the OECD`s only on 
disbursement. The figures refer to net disbursement which means gross 
disbursement minus repayment of principal. Therefore the OECD loan figure for 
2002 is $971.9 million, but the figure published by the Japanese government is 
$1,020 bn (Yen1,212 bn).(60)   
 
The irony is therefore that while the discussion about ending the loan programme 
is going on and commitment figures have been halved since their peak in FY2000, 
actual disbursement of loans to China has been increasing: The gross disbursement 
to China in 2003 was Yen1,149 bn which increased in 2004 to Yen1,271 bn. The 
reason for this is that it can take up to 5-7 years from loan commitment to final 
disbursement. As a result actual disbursement will still increase until 2008. There 
have even been reports in the Japanese media that China’s annual repayment is 
already higher than new loan commitments.(61) This does not seem yet the case 
but the figures are very close: The gross disbursement to China in 2003 was 
Yen1,149 bn whereas the repayment amounted to about Yen1,052 bn (consisting 
of Y652 bn in principal repayment and an estimated Yen400 bn in interest). 
 
Looking at JBIC’s figures for FY 2003, the following complex picture of the 
current loan situation emerges: 
 
25 projects committed   Yen  967 bn 
Gross disbursement    Yen 1,149 bn 
Repayment of principal   Yen  652 bn 
Outstanding balance of principal   Yen16,808 bn 
Total number of projects since the beginning  338   
Total commitment    Yen30,904 bn 
 
Source: JBIC Loan Report 2004, p. 52 
 
The discussion of closure 2004-05             
 
It is against this background of a general as well as China-specific reorientation of 
ODA, mounting grievances against China, and a significant drop of new loan 
commitments to China that the official discourse from 2004 onwards began to refer 
to the ending of Japan’s ODA. The year 2004 had seen a further deterioration of 
the bilateral relationship, with China still refusing a summit meeting in either 
country because of the Prime Minister’s Yasukuni Shrine visits, anti-Japanese 
outbursts at the Asian Cup soccer matches in the summer, the ratching up of the 
territorial conflicts in the East China Sea, the Chinese refusal of accepting an EEZ 
around Japan’s Okinotori island in the Pacific, and the November intrusion by a 
Chinese submarine into Japanese territorial waters.   
 
Public demands for ending at least the yen loan programme had been heard since 
about the middle of the 1990s. In 1995 the Japan Forum on International Relations 
called in a policy paper for a serious reexamination of ODA to China and asked 
whether Japan should continue yen loans to China.(62) It also demanded a strict 
application of the four ODA principles to China and expression of concern about 
China’s military modernization. In 1997 a paper by the ruling LDP on ‘Japan’s 
Strategy towards the Asia-Pacific Region’ had referred to the era of loan credits 
drawing to a close.(63) The demands for reviewing ODA to China were also 
encouraged by the furore created on 9 November 2000 by Kamei Shizuka`s 30 % 
ODA reduction demand for FY2001 although in the end the cuts amounted to only 
3 %.(64) Finally the government had to yield to this mounting pressure and at the 
end of November 2000 it was reported for the first time that the government had 
decided to reduce the amount of ODA to China (65). 
 
According to my research the first official references to the ending of the Yen loan 
programme at the highest government level came in October 2004. On 3 October 
2004, just after taking up the post of foreign minister, the hawkish Machimura 
Nobutaka told an ODA-related gathering in Tokyo (‘Gaimusho Town Meeting’) 
that China would graduate from Japanese aid ''someday'' but with many 
impoverished people still in the inland area it was now still too early.(66) On 22 
November 2004 the minister mentioned that it was appropriate that China would 
graduate from Japan’s ODA in the ‘near future’.(67) This statement was echoed by 
Prime Minister Koizumi on 28 November on his way to an ASEAN meeting in 
Laos when he said that that ‘the time to graduate [from ODA] had come.(68) 
According to Masuda he said ‘I hope that China would become a donor in the 
future. We would like to think of what to do with ODA from a broader 
perspective’ (Chugoku ga shorai, enjo suru gawa ni mawatte itadakereba to kitai 
shite iru. Taikyokuteki ni kongo no ODA no arikata wo kangaete ikitai).(69) The 
government’s statements were generally supported by the media. Even the liberal 
Asahi Shimbun argued that ‘When the recipient of economic assistance has 
become self-sustaining, it is only natural to end the assistance or divert it to a 
different area or another nation’.(70) In November 2004, a House of Councillor 
commission published a report on ODA on various countries, including China, and 
recommended in the case of China to eventually end ODA because it was not 
necessary.(71) As reasons were mentioned China’s economic success, Japan’s own 
financial problems, the increase in military expenditure, China’s manned space 
venture and the anti-Japanese education. The argument that Japan’s ODA should 
contribute to eliminate the great wealth disparities in China was rebutted with the 
idea that such redistribute tasks were a domestic Chinese issue.(72)  
 
The Chinese government showed its displeasure about the linkage between Japan`s 
ODA and criticism of its policies and took a defiant attitude. When asked about his 
Japanese counterpart’s announcement on 22 November, Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing was quoted as saying "The Chinese people only need to rely on their 
own intelligence, power, unity and determination to build a developed 
country".(73) According to a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
members of the Chinese Finance Ministry even expressed the opinion to the 
Japanese side in talks in 2005 that China no longer needed yen loans.(74) Other 
comments were more guarded. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was quoted as saying 
that Beijing wanted to `deal with the issue appropriately`.(75) A few days later he 
was quoted as having said that the bilateral relationship would be shattered if 
economic assistance would be ended.(76) The Deputy Spokesman of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry declared on 30 November that he hoped that ODA would play an 
active role in the development of the bilateral relationship. ‘Irresponsible 
discussions will only damage Japanese-Chinese relations’ and ‘We cannot 
understand the Japanese domestic discussions. ODA has to be seen against a 
special political and historical background’.(77) The Chinese official news agency 
Xinhua published an editorial on the abandonment of the loan programme in which 
it mentioned that the Chinese Foreign Ministry considered that there was still today 
a special historical background to this issue, thus indirectly referring to the 
perception of Japan’s ODA being reparations.(78) It was later reported that Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao reacted rather cool to Koizumi’s above proposal and while 
expressing his appreciation of the positive role of Japan’s ODA for China’s 
economic development he urged the Japanese prime minister to ‘end well what had 
started well’ (shan shi shan zhong) and to avoid that ending the yen programme 
would become a new political problem. They reached an understanding in general 
to conduct working level negotiations which would lead within several year (su 
nen) to an end of new loans.(79) 
 
Probably in response to these Chinese reactions, Foreign Minister Machimura had 
became more guarded. In December 2004 he mentioned a review of the aid policy 
with a view of reducing and eventually ending it, but with a soft-landing scenario 
in mind (nanchakuriku).(80) On 14 December the Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
even put the consideration of any changes to the next ODA country plan for China 
‘within a year or two’.(81)  
 
From the very beginning of 2005, however, the Japanese government hardened its 
stance and forced the pace. In January the new Vice Foreign Minister Yachi 
Shotaro urged to decide when to terminate ODA and said that "There is no need to 
provide ODA to a nation that does not feel the need to receive it".(82) The Sankei 
Shimbun reported on 16 January that the government had decided to propose to 
China that the two governments should jointly compile a report by summer which 
would agree on a positive note about the ending of the loan programme, and 
consider the possibility of extending ODA to developing countries.(83) At the end 
of January it was reported that the Gaimusho’s ‘Comprehensive ODA Strategy 
Committee’ (ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi) had decided on 24 January that it would 
start a fundamental review process at its next meeting in March.(84) In March the 
government finally let it known that it had told China about plans to begin cutting 
the size of its low-interest yen loans from this fiscal year, aiming to phase them out 
entirely by fiscal 2008, while grants and technical aid would be given for training 
and environmental protection programmes.(85) Grant aid was also to be phased out 
at some point in the future. The year 2008 was obviously chosen because of the 
Beijing Olympics which in Japanese eyes marks a country’s graduation from ODA 
loans as it has done for Japan when it staged the Olympics in 1964. On the 17 
March the Foreign Affairs Committee of the LDP (Gaiko Kankei Godo Bukai) 
confirmed the intention of the party to end the loan programme by 2008 after 
having listened to a statement by Foreign Minister Machimura. This was endorsed 
by the chairman of the Special Committee on ODA, former Foreign Minister 
Takamura Masahiro who is also chairman of the Japan-China Parliamentarian 
League (Nitchu Giren). The hawks of the party even demanded a total end of 
Japan’s ODA, including grants.(86) In the press conference of the Foreign Ministry 
on 29 March 2005, the spokesman mentioned that ` Japan is planning to phase out 
the new yen loans to China by the time of the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. 
 
In the same month the Deputy Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry used 
again the same expression of ‘shan shi shan zhu’ (in Japanese: yushu no bi wo 
kazareru yo) which Prime Minister Wen Jiabao had used in November 2004 to 
achieve an amicable ending of the aid programme. He pointedly repeated the 
Chinese view of the loan programme when he said that ''Yen loans are a mutually 
beneficial arrangement that came into being under special policies and against a 
historical backdrop''.(87) On the occasion of the above mentioned LDP meeting of 
17 March the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianzhao declared that the 
relationship as a whole should not suffer damage from the outcome of the talks and 
the politization of the ending of the Yen loan programme should actively be 
avoided.(88) According to the Tokyo Shimbun he confirmed the begin of 
consultations with Japan on ending the yen programme.(89) Foreign Minister 
Machimura declared in March that he had basically agreed with Foreign Minister 
Li Zhaoxing in a telephone conversation that new ODA loan commitments would 
be completed by the 2008 Beijing Olympics.(90) He was, however, on the same 
day contradicted by the Chief Cabinet Secretary who stated that the two sides were 
still negotiating, and this was echoed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s 
spokesman.(91) That no formal agreement had been reached at least at that point is 
also supported by reports that the Chinese side showed its interest in continuing the 
loan programme since, as announced by the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
China ‘proposed a number of new projects that would require the extension of a 
huge amount of yen loans’.(92) However, for the Japanese government, the ending 
of the loan programme by 2008 was decided. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The developments leading to the Japanese government`s decision in 2005 to end 
all ODA loans by 2008 was clearly taken for political reasons, taking into 
consideration the criticism of certain Chinese policies, the deterioration of Japan`s 
relations with China, the fast economic development of China with its implications 
for Japan`s interests, and a general aid fatigue of public opinion against the 
backdrop of Japan`s economic and budgetary problems. The political character of 
the decision is obvious from the fact that the government at no point referred to its 
usual guidelines for ending ODA loans or explained the standard by which China 
would be considered to have graduated to become a developing country.(93) It 
would have demanded considerable political foresight by the relevant government 
agencies and the politicians to face the inevitable need of graduating China from 
yen loans in order to avoid that the decision making process could be hijacked by 
the vagaries of Japanese-Chinese political relations. However, apart from inertia, 
there were strong political and bureaucratic interests which worked against this. 
For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ending of yen loans (and thus the possible 
opening of the Pandora`s Box of a total ending of ODA to China) would deprive 
the Ministry of its most potent foreign policy instrument vis-à-vis China while 
sending (more) negative signals to China and setting a precedent for either other 
ODA cuts or for reinforcing the current momentum of restructuring ODA 
policymaking at the expense of the Foreign Ministry. The Japanese government 
can also not be interested in losing a debtor which so far had always punctually 
repaid its loans from Japan. This cannot be said of Indonesia which is among the 
top three debtors. Although there are certainly needier countries than China for yen 
loans, China with its excellent repayment record will be difficult to replace.  
 
This lack of foresight has led to acrimonious exchanges between the two countries, 
further inflamed the history issue (reparation-ODA linkage) which is already at a 
critical point because of Koizumi`s Yasukuni Shrine visits and reduced even more 
China`s willingness to properly appreciate Japan`s ODA loan programme. Instead 
of being able to celebrate the successful closure of Japan`s main ODA category 
and serving as a welcome opportunity to reduce tensions at a difficult moment in 
the bilateral relationship, the programme ends under what the Chinese side 
perceives as a punitive cloud. Moreover, it seems that the ending of the loan 
programme has now also opened the way to end the grant programme. It was 
reported in December 2005 that no new grant aid might be scheduled from FY 
2006. Japan's grant aid to China totaled about 5.2 billion yen in fiscal 2003, 
making China the ninth-largest recipient country of such aid from Japan. Among 
Asian countries, China ranked fifth, after Pakistan, Vietnam, Cambodia and the 
Philippines.(94) As of October 2005 there was, however, no discussion about 
ending technical aid.(95)  
 
But the greatest loss to Japanese-Chinese relations may be in the longer term that 
the decline of ODA and the very much China threat-motivated reinforcement of 
the Japanese-American security cooperation will further disequilibrate Japan`s 
engagement policy towards China, by putting more emphasis on political and 
military power balancing to enhance Tokyo`s deterrent and leverage over China at 
the expense of the political and economic enticement elements of that policy. The 
Chinese side cannot escape responsibility for this development. 
 
Both sides have been trying to deflect some of the damage. The Chinese 
government is clearly still interested in receiving as much ODA from Japan as 
possible in view of its economic and political ambitions as well as the growing 
domestic unrest over increasing income disparities. The Japanese government 
showed with its `soft-landing` approach concern for any negative impact on its 
China policy. From early on there have been ideas and proposals to use ODA in 
other ways and for other purposes to advance the bilateral relationship. The 
Foreign Ministry’s Advisory Group under the chairmanship of Miyazaki Isamu in 
its 2001 report had proposed that Japan and China should cooperate in assistance to 
third world countries (South-South Cooperation), in the same vein as Japan was 
already doing with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.(96) In January 2005 it was 
proposed in the media that ODA might be used to fund the increasingly expensive 
removal of Japanese chemical weapons left over in China after 1945, as well as for 
environmental preservation and the protection of the intellectual property rights of 
Japanese companies.(97) However, at least the former proposal is not likely 
because it would require to change the current setup under which the prime 
minister`s office is in charge of the removal programme. There was also the 
proposal from a participant in a Upper House committee (Research Committee on 
International Affairs) that Japan should declare that it would be the last to cut off 
all ODA to China or that Japan should concentrate its ODA to the northeastern 
region with which Japan has closer relations.(98) It can only be hoped that the 
experience with the ending of the loan programme will from now on ensure more 
attention by both sides to the future of the grant and technical aid elements of 
Japan`s ODA and to the equilibrium of Japanese-Chinese relations in general! 
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